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Abstract 
This paper discussed about two proactive protocols which are DSDV and OLSR as 
well as two reactive protocols which are AODV and DSR. In addition, security anal-
yses have been conducted and it covered the possible attacks that can be implemented 
against Mobile Ad-hoc Network (MANET).  Furthermore, analysis and the compari-
son studies of the routing protocols in MANET that is conducted by simulation are 
discussed. The metrics have been used to compare these routing protocols are 
throughput, end to end delay, packet delivery ratio fraction verses the number of 
nodes in AODV and DSR. A black hole security attack was simulated and analyzed 
for DSDV, AODV and DSR. This study also investigated the impact of the increased 
in number of nodes used in the simulation to have more accurate results for the analy-
sis. 
Keywords. MANET; Proactive; Reactive; Hybrid; Attacks; Black hole attack. 
1. Introduction  
There are mainly three types of ad hoc routing protocols in a mobile network which 
are table-driven, on demand-driven and hybrid routing protocols. Such protocols are 
designed to solve typical limitations of networks such as high power consumption, 
low bandwidth and high error rates. Figure1 below illustrates the categorization of 
ad-hoc routing protocol. 
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Fig.1. Categorization of ad-hoc routing protocol 
These three routing types are topology based and elaborated as the following:  
1. Table-Driven Routing Protocols – Proactive 
Table-driven routing protocols are proactive routing protocols. Nodes in the networks 
are updated by consistently forwarding routing information one node to another. 
Therefore, it requires large routing tables. Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector 
(DSDV) is one type of table-driven routing protocols. 
2. On Demand-Driven Routing Protocols - Reactive 
A different approach from table-driven routing protocols is on demand-driven routing 
protocol. It is also called reactive routing protocol. The routing process only focuses 
on routes from source to destination. The protocol will start to discover the route 
within the network if the source nodes require a route to destination. Therefore, it 
requires small or no routing tables. Ad Hoc On-Demand Distance Vector (AODV) 
and Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) are examples of on demand-driven routing 
protocols. 
3. Hybrid Routing Protocols  
Hybrid routing protocols are the combination between table-driven and on demand-
driven routing protocols. Hybrid routing protocols was used for several purposes. 
One of them is to combine the advantages between the proactive and reactive routing 
protocols. Zone Routing Protocol (ZRP) is a typical hybrid routing protocols.  
Hybrid 
ZPR 
Routing Protocols Topology-based 
Proactive Reactive 
DSR AODV DSDV OLSR TBRPF 
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Dynamic Source Routing (DSR) was proposed by Broch, Johnson and Maltz for 
Mobile Ad-Hoc Network (MANET). Full source-route is aggregated in Route 
Request and sent back in Route Reply. The protocol requires each data packet to 
carry the full address for all nodes along the path. If the route to another node is 
unknown, it will initiate a route discovery process by sending many requests of route 
request (RREQ) packets. Each node receives the RREQ packets will reply to the 
RREQ message by sending the route reply (RREP) packet. However, the route to the 
destination node can be taken from its cache if the target node is already known. The 
RREQ packet will establish traverse path from destination to the source node. The 
RREP packet will use the path to reach the source node. The route error (RERR) is 
used to inform about any broken link within the network. This route information will 
be discarded from the cache. DSR routing protocols have several advantages against 
other protocols. It can store multiple routes in the route cache that eliminate a route 
discovery process. Route discovery is not needed if the source node found a valid 
route in its route cache. The protocol will be very effective in a network with low 
mobility since it will keeps route information for long period.  
Ad hoc On Demand Distance Vector (AODV) routing protocol is similar to DSR. It 
implements route discovery procedure to communicate with unknown nodes. The 
protocol is implemented based on DSR algorithm. There are two major differences 
that can be used to differentiate between DSR and AODV.  Firstly, full routing 
information is carried out by the packet in DSR; whereas in AODV, it only carries 
the destination address. Secondly, the route replies (RREP) in DSR will carry the 
address of every node along the path, whereas the route replies (RREP) in AODV 
carry the destination IP address and the sequence number only.  
The route discovery of AODV protocol is performed as bellow: 
1. Source node broadcasts RouteRequest packet. 
2. Each intermediate node gets a RouteRequest will do the following steps:  
 Establish a reverse link to the source node. 
 If request received before  discard. 
 If route to destination is available and up-to-date  return RouteReply 
using the reverse link. 
 Otherwise  rebroadcast the RouteRequest.  
3. Destination node responds with RouteReply using the reverse link. 
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Destination-Sequenced Distance Vector (DSDV) is a driven-table proactive routing 
protocol which is using the Bellman-Ford algorithm to calculate paths [1]. The cost 
metric in DSDV is hop count, which is the number of hops that the packet will use to 
reach its destination. DSDV keeps the routing table for all the nods of the network. 
Moreover, DSDV uses periodic and triggers updates to maintain the routing table 
corrected and efficient in the networks. Due to this updates, routing loops can be 
occurred in the network. However, the nodes that use DSDV will be triggered with a 
sequence number to eliminate the routing loops in the network. When a periodic 
update occurs, the nodes will increase the sequence number by 2 and add the updates 
information to the routing message. Moreover, when the node desires to send an 
update for an expired route, the node will increase the sequence number by 1. In this 
case the nodes which receive this update will eliminate the expired route from the 
routing table.  In DSDV, the nodes cannot change the sequence number from other 
nodes. 
Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) [2] is a proactive protocol. It means, the path 
from the source to the destination is discovered and saved before sending the packets. 
In OLSR, the link state information is discovered by propagating HELLO messages 
and topology control TC. When the node receives this information, it will process to 
calculate the next hop for all the nodes in the networks. HELLO messages are able to 
discover two-hop neighbor information and select a set of multipoint relays (MPRs). 
Furthermore, transmitting the messages and constructing link state are the 
responsibilities of MPRs. OLSR makes sure that all the nodes are updated with the 
link state by flooding the topology data frequently through the network. 
2. Related Work 
Pradish Dadhania et. al., [3] evaluated the performance of AODV and DSR routing 
protocol under black hole attack. The author of the paper used NS2 to simulate the 
mobile network environment. The node starts at a random position, waits for the 
pause time, and then moves to another random position. The size of the packet is 512 
bytes and a transmission rate is 4 packets. The simulation setup consists of such 
nodes without attack and nodes with the attack. Three parameters have been chosen 
in this simulation which consists of throughput, end to end delay and packet delivery 
ratio. The performance of AODV and DSR are affected very badly during the black 
hole attacks. 
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D. Deepthi Veronica et. al., [4] evaluated various MANET routing protocols such as 
AODV and DSR. Three network parameters have been chosen in the simulation 
consists of packet delivery fraction, throughput and end to end delay. As usual, NS2 
has been used to simulate and evaluate the performance of AODV and DSR. Two 
experiment scenarios have been setup in the paper with different specific values. The 
number of nodes in first scenario was 9, whereas the number of nodes in second 
scenario was 16. The graph or results are varying between AODV and DSR.  
Sahil Gupta et. al., [5] examined the performance of popular reactive protocols. 
AODV and DSR were respectively tested based on variation of node density and 
mobility. Throughput and average end to end delay were the parameters used to 
determine the performance of the AODV and DSR based on the increasing node 
density. The experiment conducts two types of scenarios consist of varied nodes 
density and pause time. Higher node in AODV showed an extreme degradation 
performance of the routing protocols itself.  
Rachit Jain et. al., [6] analyze the behavior of several routing protocols like AODV 
and DSR with path loss propagation models. Popular performance metric such as 
throughput, average end to end delay, average jitter and packet delivery fraction have 
been chosen in the simulation experiments. The main contribution of the project is to 
choose the correct protocol for any active operating environment.  
Nisarg Gandhewar and Rahila Patel [7] evaluated the performance of AODV by 
simulating the routing protocol in NS2. Different metrics were chosen in the 
simulation experiments consists of average end to end delay, packet delivery ratio 
and packet loss. The numbers of nodes were varied in each parameter. The 
performance of AODV protocol was extremely degraded when the numbers of nodes 
are increased.  
S. Mohapatra et. al., [8] conducted a simulation experiment to evaluate the 
performance of AODV, DSR, OLSR and DSDV protocols using NS2 simulator. The 
parameters were chosen in the simulation consists of delay, throughput, control 
overhead and packet delivery ratio. These parameters were tested with different 
number of nodes, different speed (pause time) of nodes and different size of network. 
The authors run 10 random simulations to produce 10 random scenario patterns. The 
results of the scenario pattern generate 10 outputs.  
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Umadevi Chezhian and Raja Adeel Ahmad [9] analyzed two types of parameters 
which are average delay and throughput to evaluate the performance of Ad Hoc 
Network Protocols such as AODV, DSR, TORA and DSDV. The researchers used 
different network size, pause times and mobility velocity. The result of each routing 
protocol are varied between each other due to the changes of the network size and 
pause time.  
Many other researchers have simulated related MANET proactive protocols for 
DSDV and OLSR such as performance evaluation for DSDV and OLSR. The 
researchers considered the throughput, end to end delay (E2ED) and normalized 
routing load (NRL) [10]. Some researchers evaluated and compared the Packet 
Delivery Ratio (PDR), Normalized Routing Overhead (NRO) and average E2ED for 
DSDV and OLSR [11].  
Other researchers conducted performance comparison of the throughput, packet 
drops and the TCP variants over DSDV and OLSR [12]. Others present the path loss 
model and comparison for DSDV and OLSR above 802.11 and 802.11p [13].  
Another related works were simulated a novel attack on DSDV routing [14]. Also 
some other researchers simulated the performance and evaluated DSDV on TCP and 
UDP environments. These researchers examined the throughput of the received 
packets, throughput of the dropped packets, E2ED, packet delivery fraction and 
routing load [15].  
Besides, simulated and compared DSDV, AODV and DSR in 802.11 MAC for grid 
topology in MANET with consideration for the metrics of E2ED Vs. no. of nodes, 
received packets Vs. no. of nodes, packet delivery ratio Vs. no. of nodes and total 
dropped packets Vs. no. of nodes [16]. Furthermore, some researchers simulated and 
compared AODV, DSDV and DSR with the some metrics such as Average energy 
consumption, normalized routing load and average of throughput [17]. 
3. Routing Attacks Analysis 
This section discusses the attacks against MANET routing protocols in general. 
Moreover, it elaborates the attacks that could be used against DSR, AODV, DSDV, 
and OLSR as well. 
3.1 Flooding Attack  
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In this attack, the attacker aims to reduce the networks performance by exhausting 
their resources [18]. The attacker tries to increase the bandwidth in the network, 
consumes the nodes resources such as a battery power and processing more 
operations. This attack will reduce the network performance. For instance, a 
malicious code in AODV protocol is able to send a huge numbers of RREQs to a 
fake destination or to a node which is not existed in the network. Therefore, a flood 
of RREQs is sent to all the nodes in the network which consumes the battery power 
of the nodes and the bandwidth of the network as well. Consequently, this flood 
attack can lead to denial of a service. 
3.2 Replay Attack 
MANET does not have fixed infrastructure, also the mobility of MANET nodes is 
one major characteristic in the network. Therefore, one of the nodes may not be 
existed anymore in the network or out of range. Moreover, a node A records node’s B 
valid control messages to resend it later while node B is already out of range. 
Therefore, other nodes in the network would update their routing table with stale and 
expired routing information [19]. In addition, Replay Attack may be used to 
impersonate a specific node which no longer exists in the network of MANET. 
3.3 Wormhole Attack 
A wormhole attack is sophisticated attack in MANET. A wormhole attack can be 
implemented using private high speed network. Two attackers are working together 
to record packets at one location, and then they forward those packets at different 
locations [20]. Wormhole attack will  make other nodes record incorrect routing 
information in their routing tables. It is really serious matter that wormhole attack can 
be implemented against all the communications that provide confidentiality and 
authenticity.  
3.4 Black hole Attack 
In the black hole attack, the attacker tries to gain all the packets from the source 
[21][22]. The attacker will use a malicious node to gain all the packets from the 
source by suggesting a fake route through itself. The malicious node will suggest 
better route than other nodes to convince the source node that its route is the best. 
Therefore, the source node will choose the malicious node as the best way to the 
destination. So, the attacker will receive all the packets that come from the source 
node. Moreover, the attacker will be able to drop the entire received packets.  For 
instance, in AODV, the malicious node will response for RREQ from the source and 
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it will reply with the best RREP to the source. Therefore, the source will believe that 
the malicious node is the best hop count to reach to the destination.  
3.5 Gray hole Attack  
The gray hole attack has the same implementation steps of the black hole attack. 
Therefore, the attacker will use a malicious code with showing the best path to have 
all the traffics. However, the difference between the black hole and the gray hole is 
that the black hole attack will discard or misuse all the received packets while the 
gray hole attack will forward the received packets to the destination [22].   
3.6 Link Spoofing Attack 
In this attack, the attacker uses a malicious node to cheat the target node with a fake 
or non-existed link. So, the target node will choose the malicious node to send the 
data to the destination [23]. For example, in OLSR, the malicious node will show 
the best link state to the destination, so that the target node will believe that the ma-
licious node is the best way to the destination. Therefore, the malicious node will be 
the target node MPR. The MPR malicious node will receive all the packets from the 
target node. Therefore, it will be able to modify the received packets or discard all 
of them. 
3.7 Link Withholding Attack  
In link withholding attack, a malicious ignores the requirement to advertise a link 
state to one or more nodes in the network. This attack will lead to link lose and 
communication lost to the targeted node. Link withholding attack will make the other 
nodes in the network unable to see the targeted node in the advertisement of the 
malicious node. This attack is considered as serious matter in link states protocols. 
3.8 Collusion Attack 
In this attack, two or more attackers work in collusion with each other to disrupt the 
routing process. The attackers aim to modify or drop the received packets from the 
targeted node. Collusion attack is difficult to be detected by using some conventional 
techniques such as pathrater and watchdog [23]. For example, a targeted node sends 
the packets to X malicious node. X malicious node is forwarding the received packets 
to Y malicious node as usual to avoid any detection from the targeted node. 
Therefore, malicious node Y will be able to modify or drop the received packets.  
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3.9 Selfish Behavior  
MANET nodes are suffering from selfish behavior. The selfish behavior of MANET 
nodes prevents them from forwarding the received packets to the other nodes in the 
network. The reason of this behavior is the nodes are trying to preserve their 
resources from being exhausted [24]. For instance, node A participates in all the 
operations in the network. However, node A will not forward the received packets for 
some reasons such as consuming its battery life. 
 
3.10 Broken Link Fraud Attack 
Broken link fraud attack is aimed to prevent a route to one of the legitimated nodes in 
the network by advertising a broken link fraud [25].  For example, in DSDV, one of 
the nodes misbehaves and advertises that one node is not reachable. The misbehaved 
node or the malicious node assigns the hop count as infinity in its routing table. Then 
the malicious node advertises this broken link fraud to all the other nodes. Therefore, 
the other nodes update their routing table according to the malicious code false 
information. In this case, the targeted node will be assigned as infinity in the other 
nodes routing table. Therefore, all the nodes in the network will consider the targeted 
node as non reachable node. So, the targeted node will not be used anymore for 
forwarding any information. 
4. Methods 
The following performance metrics have been used in the simulation and the analysis 
as well: 
4.1 End-to-End Delay 
Delay occurs in specific pair communicating of nodes and it is also caused by the 
data-rate of the link. The delay of packet transmission can be explained as the time 
taken for a bit of data to travel from one node to another node. All the bits take a time 
to travel across the network from one node to other nodes. End to end delay consists 
of Processing delay, Queuing delay, Transmission delay and Propagation delay. Such 
delays have different implementation methods in packet switching. 
4.2 Throughput 
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Throughput can be defined as the amount of data transferred from one place to 
another in a specified amount of time. The data transfer rates for disk drives and 
networks are measured in terms of throughput and it delivers over physical link. 
Throughputs can be measured in Kbps, Mbps and Gbps. Maximum throughput of a 
device or network maybe significantly higher than the actual throughput achieved in 
everyday use. Several factors, such as  Internet connection speed and network traffic 
may limit the data transfer.  
 
 
 
 
 
4.3 Packet Delivery Fraction 
The ratio of the data packets delivered to the destinations. The delivered data packets 
are generated by the CBR sources. Packets delivered and packets lost are taking into 
consideration as well. 
4.4 Black hole Attack 
It has been discussed in Section 3. 
4.5 Normalized Routing Load (NRL) 
Normalized routing load is the ratio between the numbers of routing packet which is 
sent over the network to the number of data packets received to the destination node 
[26]. 
5. Results and Discussion 
5.1 Simulation Environment 1 
The simulation and experiment were carried out in Ubuntu 12.04 with network-
simulator-2 (version 2.35). For the topology generation NSG 2.1 script generator 
was used. And to generate information from data, awk scripting was used. 
Traffic Model: Source and destination pairs were spread randomly and Continuous 
bit rate (CBR) traffic source used for the simulation. 
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Mobility Model: Node mobility was defined using random waypoint. Therefore, 
nodes freely move around the environment.  
 
 
 
 
 
The experiment was carried out under following scenario: 
Table 1. Scenario 1 
Parameter Value (s) 
  
Network Type Mobile 
Connection pattern Random 
Number of nodes 50, 100, 150, 200 
Simulation time 10s 
Environment size 800 x 800 
Connection pattern Constant Bit Rate (CBR) / TCP 
Packet size 512 
Queue length 50 
Protocols AODV, DSR 
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Graphs of Figure 2 show the performance of AODV and DSR based on the 
simulation scenario. It shows that the average throughput of DSR is better than 
AODV when the number of nodes is increased.  That means the amount of packets 
transferred per ms in DSR which is higher than AODV. Figure 3 shows that the 
amount of packets from source to destinations in DSR is higher than AODV as well 
as the consideration to the lost packets. 
 
 
Fig. 2. Average of Throughput 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 3. Average of Packet delivery fraction ratio 
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In Figure 4, the time that DSR takes to deliver the data is higher than AODV; which 
means AODV has a lower ratio of delay. This makes AODV faster than DSR in 
delivering the packets. 
 
Fig. 4. Average of End to End Delay 
 
5.2 Simulation Environment 2 
Black hole attack was simulated to evaluate the performance of AODV, DSR and 
DSDV under an attack situation. Following parameters were used to simulate the 
black hole attack. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Scenario 2 
0
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no of nodes 
End to End delay 
AODV DSR
Parameter Value (s) 
Network Type Mobile 
Connection pattern Random 
Number of nodes  20, 50, 90, 150 
Simulation time 450s 
Environment size 700 x 700 
Connection pattern Constant Bit Rate (CBR) / UDP 
Packet size 150 
Queue length 50 
Protocols AODV, DSR, DSDV 
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In Figure 5, AODV, DSR and DSDV protocols were under the black hole attack. 
From the results, DSDV and AODV have almost similar values for the through-
put. Moreover, both of DSDV and AODV have a smaller ratio of throughput for 
the delivered packets comparing to DSR. That means that DSR has more re-
sistance for black hole attack. Figure 6 shows the normalized routing load for DSR 
is higher compared to DSDV and AODV. Moreover, DSDV and AODV have the 
same normalized routing load when they are under black hole attack. That means 
AODV and DSDV have more efficient route than DSR. Figure 7 show that DSDV 
and AODV have higher packet delivery fraction than DSR. DSDV and AODV 
have almost the same value which means both of them are better than DSR. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 5. Average of Throughput under Black hole attack 
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Fig. 6. Average of Normalization under the Black hole attack 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 7. Average of Packet delivery under the Black hole attack 
6. Conclusion 
In conclusion, this paper discussed the security attacks that MANET faces in the real 
world. Moreover, a performance analyses for DSR and AODV based on throughput 
vs. the number of nodes, the end to end delay vs. the number of nodes and packet 
delivery ratio fraction vs. the number of nodes. Moreover, in this paper, results 
through simulation of the black hole attack were generated and compared for 
DSDV, AODV and DSR. This research is more accurate than previous researches, 
because it increased the number of nodes used in the simulation compared to previ-
ous researches. In the near future, further simulations and solution will be intro-
duced to continue the testing of the other security attacks for proactive and reactive 
protocols. 
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